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Atkins v. Virginia: How Flawed Conclusions Convert
Good Intentions Into Bad Law
"It may be truly saidto have neitherFORCEnor WILL, but
merelyjudgment" '
I. INTRODUCTION

Defending what some labeled a potentially tyrannical judiciary,
Alexander Hamilton authored the above phrase of art, concluding
that, so long as the judiciary never co-mingled with the other
branches of government, it could do no true harm to the young
republic.2 This notion usually will hold true, and the American
people will not lash out against the courts or demand accountability
unless they perceive a decision to be unjust or infringe on some right
they believe to be "fundamental." 3 Rarely, however, does the public
at large demand that judicial heads be counted in response to an
opinion which has the appearance of extending liberties.4 Selfinterested complacency ofthis sort is magnified when courts address
difficult scientific issues, leaving the populous trapped as pawns in a
game of experts. Therefore, it is imperative that tortuous cases like
these be scrutinized with common sense and disinterested thought.
The usual suspects often forgo such exercises, with many media
outlets and "health organizations" failing to sufficiently analyze rules
of law based on complex and dynamic scientific constructs. 5
In the summer of 2002, the United State Supreme Court ruled on
Atkins v. Virginia6 and held that executing mentally retarded capital
offenders violates the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel
and unusual punishments. Not many people truly know what it
Copyright 2005, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw.
1. The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
2. Id.
3. One need look no fiurther than the extreme backlash ofpublic opinion after
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000), to see how angry the public can
get, even if only half of the public is angry with the decision.
4. It is probably important to distinguish the issue of abortion, which may
appear to some to extend liberties with regards to the mother, but enrages many
because of what they perceive to be the infringement of the rights of the unborn
child.
5. See, e.g., AAMR, AAMR Applauds U.S. Supreme Court Decision to Ban
Execution of Persons with Mental Retardation, at http://www.aamr.org/Reading_
Room/pdf/atkins_062002.pdf (last visited Dec. 22, 2004) for the organization's
response to A tkins and general agreement with all ofitsfindings; Linda Greenhouse,
Top CourtHearsArgument on Execution ofRetarded,N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 2002,
at Al; Morgan Cloud and George Shepherd, Low IQ andthe Death Penalty,N.Y.
Times, Feb. 20, 2002, at A2 1.
6. 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (2002).
7. U.S. Constitutional amendment VIII states "Excess punishments shall not
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means for a person to be "mentally retarded," and may get the
impression that those so diagnosed make up a clearly defined group
with the same illness and deficiencies. The American Association
of Mental Retardation (AAMR) defines mental retardation by using
a three-dimensional framework, in which a person is not considered
to be mentally retarded unless he first exhibits limitations in
intellectual functioning, typically manifested by an IQ of less than
seventy! One assessing a suspected mentally retarded person must
also find that his ability to function in the world or adapt to his
environment is significantly impaired. 9 Finally, the AAMR
suggests that in order to accurately diagnose someone with mental
retardation, the intellectual and adaptive deficiencies must manifest
before the person reaches the age of eighteen."0
Unfortunately, however, assessing mental retardation is anything
but a precise science. The majority in Atkins failed to adequately
consider this, making its holding very confusing and functionally
difficult for states to implement. Essentially, the majority based its
holdings on two legal findings. First, the majority held that
executing mentally retarded offenders is unconstitutional because
a "consensus" of states have proclaimed that the practice is cruel
and unusual and therefore violates the Eighth Amendment. To
support this assertion, however, the majority ignored the
methodologies of previous cases undertaking this exact exercise,
opting instead to sketch a make-shift method that is unworthy to
Such constitutionally
effect a constitutional determination.
inappropriate methodology is devastating and may unleash a
chilling effect upon what Justice Brandeis referred to as the
"experimentation" of state legislatures in the fields of social and
economic policy." Second, the majority buttressed its lackluster
"consensus" analysis with a scientific conclusion that is anything
but scientific, making the holding unsupportable and confusing for
state courts and legislatures to follow.
be required, nor excess fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
8.

AAMR, Definition of Mental Retardation, at http://www.aamr.org/

Policies/faqmental-retardation.shtml (last visited Dec. 29, 2002). To quote it
literally, AAMR website defines mental retardation as a "disability characterized
by significant limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior,
as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills. The disability
originates before the age of 18." Id. The AAMR suggests that these limits on
intellectual functioning are usually represented by an IQ score below seventy on one
ofthe recognized standardized testing devices. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,311,52 S. Ct. 371, 386-87
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Part II of this note discusses the facts and opinions ofAtkins as
well as United States Supreme Court cases that preceded it
concerning the Eighth Amendment and a defendant's mental state.
Part III analyzes the majority's holding that there existed a
"consensus" of states that found the execution of mentally retarded
capital offenders to violate the Eighth Amendment, and concludes
by subjecting the majority's other rationale, its scientific findings,
to criticism from experts and authors in the field of psychology.
Part IV discusses some of the early ways that courts and state
legislatures have attempted to deal with Atkins, and Part V offers
concluding thoughts.
II. ATKINS V. VIRGINIA

A. The Facts
At approximately midnight on August 16, 1996, after spending
most of the day drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana, the
defendant Daryl R. Atkins and a partner, William Jones, drove to a
convenience store intending to rob a customer at gunpoint.' 2 Instead
of carrying out the crime at the store, the pair chose to abduct their
male victim, Eric Nesbitt, and drive him to a nearby automated teller
machine where they forced him to withdraw two-hundred dollars. 3
After the violently forced extraction, the pair smuggled the victim to
a deserted area, and, ignoring his relentless pleas for life, ordered him
out of the vehicle, at which time Atkins shot him eight times.' 4
Atkins and Jones failed to avoid the ATM's cameras, however, and
were arrested and charged with capital murder. 5 Each suspect told
police a similar story ofthe events, with the key distinction being that6
both claimed that the other had pulled the trigger to murder Nesbitt.
Deciding that Jones's story was more credible, the state chose to use
his testimony and seek the death penalty against Atkins, who it
believed was the shooter.' 7 At trial, the jury heard testimony from
both Atkins and Williams, agreed with the state's assessment ofthe
case, and convicted Atkins of capital murder.'8 They sentenced him
to death.' 9

12.

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,338, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2259 (2002).

13.

Id.

14.
15.

Id.
Id. at307&n.1,122S. Ct. at2244&n.1.

16. Id.
17.

Id. at 307 & n.1, 122 S. Ct. at 2244-45 & n.1.

18. Id.
19.

Id. at 309, 122 S. Ct. at 2245.

476

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 65

The initial death sentence was overturned. 2' The trial court
conducted a new sentencing hearing, in which the defense presented
mitigating evidence in the form ofpsychological testimony that sought
to establish that Atkins should not be executed because he was
mentally retarded.2' In expert testimony, Dr. Evan Nelson opined that
Atkins was "mildly mentally retarded," and possessed an IQ of fiftynine.2' Nelson also suggested that Atkins displayed certain adaptive
behavioral impairments, that "he was a 'slow learner,' who showed a
'lack of success in pretty much every domain of his life,' and that he
had an 'impaired' capacity to appreciate the criminality ofhis conduct"
and conform to the law.23 Nelson based his diagnostic conclusions on
results from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Test, and grounded the
adaptive findings upon his review of past school and court records
along with interviews of people who knew Atkins.24
In response, the prosecution offered testimony from its own expert
witness, Dr. Stranton Samenow, who, after interviewing Atkins twice
and asking him questions from the standard IQ test, testified that there
was no evidence that he was mentally retarded, and that he was at least
of average intelligence.2 ' Refusing to suggest that Atkins was
completely normal, the prosecution's expert submitted that he believed
the defendant suffered from anti-social personality disorder and an
overall distaste for academic exercise.26 Aggravating evidence included
photos of Nesbitt's badly mutilated body and the testimony of victims
from Atkins's sixteen prior felony convictions. 27 After weighing all of
the testimony, and being judicially reinstructed according to Virginia
law, the jury once again sentenced Atkins to death. 28 Affirming the
sentence, the Virginia Supreme Court declared that they would not
commute Atkins's sentence to life solely because of his IQ score.29
20. Id. at 338, 122 S. Ct. at 2259. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction but ordered resentencing because the trial court had used an "improper
verdict form." Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 308-09, 122 S. Ct. at 2245-46. It should also be noted that the
standard error of measurement for the test is five, therefore Atkins real IQ should
be fifty-four to sixty-four.
23. Id. at 338, 122 S. Ct. at 2259-60 (citations omitted).
24. Id. at 308-09 & n.5, 122 S. Ct. at 2245 & n.5.
25. Id. at 309 & n.6, 122 S. Ct. at 2246 & n.6.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 339, 122 S. Ct. at 2260. Atkins's previous felony convictions
included robbery, attempted robbery, abduction, use of a firearm, and maiming.
The victims testified as to the extreme violence in these crimes, such as when one
was hit over the head by Atkins with a beer bottle, and another victim shot in the
stomach. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 310, 122 S. Ct. at 2246 (quoting Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534
S.E.2d 312, 321 (Va. 2000)).
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B. The Road to Atkins
1. Judging the Mental State: EarlyFindings
The Supreme Court's first efforts to distinguish accused
offenders on the basis of their mental state concerned the most
severe mental impairment: insanity. Insanity, of course, does not
affect a court's ability to impose a harsh sentence, but rather is an
affirmative defense to a conviction altogether. Scholars and
advocates usually trace judicial treatment of this issue back to
M'Naugten's Case,3" an old English opinion which continues to be
the basis of the American legal standard. M'Naughten's Case
identified insanity as an affirmative defense to prosecution if the
accused did not know the "nature or quality of what he was doing;
or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong." 3
The United States Supreme Court confronted the issue ofmental
capacity in the context of the death penalty in Fordv. Wainwright32
and held that imposing the death penalty upon a person who was
insane violated the Eighth Amendment. 3 In Ford,the defendant
murdered several individuals and told police that the killings were
a part of an effort to save his friends, who, along with Senator
Edward Kennedy, had been taken captive.34 Unable to locate his
kidnapped friends, Ford claimed that those he murdered had killed
many of them and placed their bodies in concrete boxes disguised
as beds.35 He told doctors during evaluations that there was no
chance he would be executed because he owned the prison and
controlled the governor through mind waves.36 Per Justice
Marshall, the Court reversed the conviction using a traditional
analysis that executing the insane was a form of punishment
considered cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was
adopted." Justice Marshall emphasized, however, that the Court
would not be bound by the notions of what was humane in 1789.38
The Eighth Amendment, he reasoned, also recognizes "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress ofa maturing society,"
30. 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843) (cited in George E. Dix & M.
Michael Sharlot, Criminal Law: Cases and Materials 853 (5th ed. 2002)).
31. Id.
32. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 402, 106 S. Ct. at 2598.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 403, 106 S. Ct at 2598.
37. Id. at 405, 106 S. Ctat2599.
38. Id.at 406, 106 S. Ct. at 2600.
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embodied, in his opinion, by what objective evidence shows
contemporary people believe."
While insanity is the ultimate and probably most popular mental
impairment that criminal defendants seek to assert, a criminal
defendant can avoid trial altogether if he can successfully prove he
lacks the capacity to stand trial. The insanity inquiry focuses on the
defendant's state of mind at the time of the offense; competency
concerns a defendant's "present" ability to understand the criminal
processes at the beginning of prosecution.4" The United States
Supreme Court explained the test for competency in Dusky v. United
States:4 a trial court must determine whether the defendant has the
"present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree
of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as
factual understanding ofthe proceedings against him. 42 It should be
noted, however, that the Courts' analysis regarding incompetency is
generally one grounded in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees of due process and not any interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments.43
2. Have We Evolved Yet?: Stanford v. Kentucky"
Ford challenged the way that states viewed executing capital
offenders, but its evolving standard provoked serious debate for years
to come.45 In Stanford v. Kentucky, the Court addressed whether
society had "evolved" to the point where a "consensus" of states
disfavored executing juveniles. 6 Here, the defendant, then seventeen
years and four months old, robbed a gas station and repeatedly raped
and sodomized the twenty-year old female attendant. 47 Following the
robbery, the defendant and an accomplice drove the victim to a
39. Id. The language "evolving standards of decency" was taken from the
plurality opinion in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S. Ct. 590, 598 (1958).
40. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Wertkin, Competency To Stand Trial, 90 Geo. L.J.
1514 (2002); United States v. Santos, 131 F.3d 16,20 (1 st Cir. 1997) (the standards
for incompetency and insanity are different in procedure and substance).
41. 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788 (1960).
42. Id. at 402, 80 S.Ct. at 789.
43. See, e.g., Wertkin, supranote 40.
44. 492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969 (1989).
45. See Timothy S. Hall, Legal Fictions and Moral Reasoning: Capital
Punishment and the Mentally Retarded Defendant After Penry v. Johnson, 35
Akron L. Rev. 327,364 (2002); Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "DecentRespect" To
World Opinion on the DeathPenalty,35 U.C. Davis. L. Rev. 1085, 1121 (2002);
Joseph A. Nese, Jr., The FateofMentally RetardedCriminals:An Examinationof
the ProprietyofTheirExecutionUnderthe EightAmendment,40 Duq. L. Rev. 373,
398-401 (2002).
46. Stanford,492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969.
47. Id. at 365, 109 S.Ct. at 2973.
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secluded area near the station where Stanford shot her twice and
killed her.48 The jury convicted him ofmurder, robbery, and sodomy,
and sentenced him to death. 49 Believing that objective manifestations
of purpose were needed to conclude that that societal opinion had
"evolved" on the issue of executing juveniles, Justice Scalia denied
the defendant's request for relief, reasoning that only fifteen of the
thirty-seven states that permitted capital punishment banned the
execution of sixteen-year-olds and twelve of the thirty-seven banned
the execution of seventeen-year-olds. 5 ° The majority also shed light
on what the court would recognize as true objective evidence.
Responding to amicus briefs filed by national and international
political and human rights organizations, the Court declared that
public opinion polls, views of interests groups, and the suggestions
of professional organizations were too uncertain to serve as
foundations ofconstitutional law and refused to give them any weight
in the analysis. 5
3. Genesis of Controversy: Penry and MentalRetardation
In Penryv. Lynaugh,5 2 the Supreme Court issued its first opinion
regarding the constitutionality of executing mentally retarded
defendants convicted of capital murder. 3 On October 25, 1979,
Pamela Carpenter was brutally raped, beaten, and stabbed with
scissors at her Livingston, Texas home.54 Before the victim died,
she was able to give the police a description of her attacker.55 This
led police to John Paul Penry, a twenty-two year old who had
recently won parole on another rape conviction.56 At a pre-trial
competency hearing, the defense presented psychological testimony
suggesting that Penry was mildly to moderately mentally retarded,
possessed an IQ between fifty and sixty-three, and had the mental
age of a six and a half year old and the social maturity of a nine or
ten year old.57 After a finding that he was competent to stand trial,
Penry's lawyers presented evidence suggesting he was insane at the
time of the murder.58 Testifying during trial, Penry's expert opined
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id at 366, 109 S. Ct. at 2973.
Id. at 370-71, 109 S. Ct. at 2975-76.
Id.at 377, 109 S.Ct. at 2979.
492 U.S. 302, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
Nese, supranote 45, at 388 (citing Penry,492 U.S. 302, 109 S. Ct. 2934).
Penry, 492 U.S. at 307, 109 S. Ct. at 2941.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 307-08, 109 S. Ct. at 2941.
Id. at 308, 109 S. Ct. at 2941.
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that it was impossible for Penry to appreciate the wrongfulness of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law.59 The
prosecution's expert, who had extensive interaction with Penry and
had diagnosed him with mental retardation twice in the past,
disagreed with the defense's conclusions and testified that Penry's
mental deficiencies did not preclude him from being able to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions, thereby making him
legally sane at the time of the offense. 60 The prosecution's expert
further explained that Penry's seemed inability to conform to the
law could be traced to his having an anti-social personality
disorder. 6' Rejecting Penry's plea of insanity, the jury convicted
him of capital murder and sentenced him to death.6
On appeal, Penry argued that, because he was mentally retarded,
his execution would violate the Eighth Amendment.63 In response,
the Court once again discussed the "evolving standards of decency"
and "consensus" analyses, and expressly chose to focus once again
on objective criteria only.'
These objective criteria, Justice
O'Connor held, can most clearly be discovered by looking to state
and federal legislation along with how juries had reacted in the past
when faced with the issue. Viewing the objective state evidence
in light of that considered in Fordand Thompson, the Court held

59. Id. at 309, 109 S. Ct. at 2941.
60. Id., 109 S. Ct. at 2942.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 310-11, 109 S. Ct at 2942-43.
63. Id. at 313, 328, 109 S. Ct. at 2943-44, 2952. Actually, there were two
issues of error. Penry's first issue of error was that the jury was not adequately
instructed on all ofthe mitigating evidence, because, he asserted, the special issues
mandated under Texas law did not adequately define certain important terms (i.e.,
deliberately). The Court reversed the sentence and remanded on this issue, holding
that the jury was not provided with a vehicle for expressing its "reasoned moral
response" to the mitigating evidence. Id. at 328, 109 S. Ct. at 2951.
64. Id. at 330-31, 109 S. Ct. at 2953. Justice O'Connor also undertook a
discussion as to whether this execution would be prohibited if the definition of
"cruel and unusual" preferred by Justice Scalia in Stanford were controlling, that
being if the practice was "cruel and unusual," or barbaric, at the time of the
amendment. Id. at 330-31, 109 S. Ct. at 2953. Citing Blackstone, she noted that,
at common law, the "idiot" and the "lunatic," were generally not candidates for
execution. Id. at 331, 109 S. Ct. at 2953. She also quoted eighteenth century legal
text to note that this classification was reserved for "those who are under a natural
disability to distinguish between good and evil." Id. Such persons, she noted would
probably be deemed "profoundly" or "severely" retarded today. Id.at 333, 109 S.
Ct. at 2954. This would not present a problem such as in the present case, however,
as she concluded that these people would either be afforded the insanity defense or
would be declared incompetent to stand trial. Id.
65. Id.
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that no "evolution" had occurred. 66in the case of mentally retarded
capital offenders, however, Penry could only show that one state
had banned their execution.67
Rejecting the assertion that society's standards for executing
mentally retarded capital offenders had changed, the Court then
addressed Penry's contention that capitally sentencing such offenders
would be disproportionate to their degree of culpability, thereby
violating the Eighth Amendment.6 s Justice O'Connor recognized that
it is clear that mental retardation, at any stage, can have some effect
on culpability, and that very severe cases may extinguish culpability
altogether. 69 However, she reasoned, executing mentally retarded
offenders did not violate the Eighth Amendment per se, in that the
Court was not willing to generalize that all those diagnosed mentally
retarded do not act with the volition and moral capacity necessary to
possess the degree of culpability associated with the death penalty.7"
Justice O'Connor noted that the majority's caution was necessitated
by the fact that the state of science in the field of mental retardation
was not clear enough to justify a broad judgment that the death
penalty was unconstitutional for these offenders. 7' The assessment of
defendants who plead mental retardation must be done on an
individual basis, the Court held, in which juries must be able to hear
all mitigating evidence concerning a defendant's mental state.72
66. Id.at 334, 109 S. Ct. at 2955. In Ford,the objective state evidence showed
that no state had permitted the execution of a person insane during the commission
of the act. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2961 (1986).
The objective state evidence in Thompson revealed that eighteen states had
expressly established a minimum age of sixteen for eligibility for execution.
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 829, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2695-96 (1988).
67. Penry,492 U.S. at 334, 109 S. Ct. at 2955. The Court also noted that the
petitioner had failed to present any evidence of the general behavior ofjuries with
respect with respect to sentencing mentally retarded defendants, nor decisions of
prosecutors. Id.
68. Id. at 336, 109 S. Ct. at 2956. In support of this theory of proportionality,
the Court cited language from Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149, 107 S. Ct.
1676, 1683 (1987), in which the Court stated that "[t]he heart of the retribution
rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal
culpability of the criminal offender." It also cited Justice O'Connor's dissent in
Enmund v. Florida,458 U.S. 782, 825, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3391 (1982), for the
notion that the Eighth Amendment's concept of proportionality requires a nexus
between the punishment imposed and the defendant's blameworthiness. The Penry
majority based these assertions on the statement in Gregv. Georgia,428 U.S. 153,
183, 96 S. Ct 2909, 2940 (1976), that "[t]he death penalty is said to serve two
principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by
prospective offenders."
69. Id. at 337-38, 109 S. Ct. at 2956-57.
70. Id. at 338, 109 S.Ct at 2956.
71. Id. at 340, 109 S. Ct. at 2958.
72. Id.
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Two sets of justices concurred in part and dissented in part.73
Justices Brennan and Marshall opined in their dissent that executing
mentally retarded offenders violates the Eighth Amendment as aper
se rule.74 These dissenting justices chose not to argue the point of
whether a consensus of society's "evolving standards of decency"
dictated this result, but rather chose to focus on the defendant's
contention that a capital sentence was disproportionate to a capital
crime when committed by a mentally retarded individual." Relying
mostly on a brief presented as amicus curiae by the American
Assoication ofthe Mentally Retarded (AAMR), Justices Marshall and
Brennan explained that because these offenders experienced an
impaired ability to control their impulsive behavior and an overall
limitation of their "moral development," their culpability is limited
to such a degree to make death an unconstitutional punishment.76
In 2001, the Supreme Court reversed Penry's conviction, and
Texas re-tried the case (hereinafter Penry I), and Penry was again
sentenced to die.77 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the death sentence for procedural reasons." PenryII is less
important to the present inquiry for what it said than for what it did
not. Despite eleven years passing between the first and second
opinions, and several legislative changes regarding executing
mentally retarded offenders, the defense did not attempt to re-present
the issue ofan emerging consensus oflike-minded states on the issue.
This void is especially peculiar considering the numerous amicus
briefs filed in the case by organizations which regularly advocate
against the death penalty. For example the AAMR, which has long
73. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
Kennedy, dissented regarding whether the Texas jury forms dealing with jurors'
consideration of mitigating factors were a violation of the constitution. Id.at 350,
109 S. Ct. at 2963 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 341, 109 S. Ct. at 2958.

75. Id.
76. Id. at 346, 109 S. Ct. at 2961.
77. Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 786, 121 S. Ct. 1910, 1915 (2001).
78. Id. at 790-99, 121 S. Ct. at 1917-21. Seeking to comply with the Penry
I order regarding the jury's ability to consider mitigating evidence, the Texas court
charged the jury with supplemental instructions forcing the jury to consider Penry's
mental status when making its sentencing decisions. Id. at 796, 121 S. Ct. 1920.
The Court, once again per Justice O'Connor, found that the jury instructions were
insufficient and declared that the Texas trial court had "misapprehended" PenryL
Id. at 797, 121 S. Ct. at 1920. Because the second set of jury instructions did not
explicitly mention the mitigating factors, the jury would be forced to answer
untruthfully in order to give the factors complete relevance, a situation that the state
felt was adequate, but that the majority deemed illogical and unethical. Making this
choice would violate the juror's oath to follow instructions and answer truthfully,
and the Court refused to sanction such a selection as a "reasoned, moral response."
Id. at 797-800, 121 S. Ct. at 1920-22.
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zealously advocated that the mentally retarded should not be
executed, filed an amicus brief which failed to mention recent
legislative treatment ofthe issue.79
After Penry II and before Atkins, the Supreme Court was given
the opportunity to re-evaluate the possibility of a new consensus of
states which agreed that mentally retarded capital offenders should
0 the defendant was
not be executed. In McCarverv. North Carolina"
convicted of capital murder despite his being diagnosed mentally
retarded and sought habeas relief from the Court. The Supreme
Court granted certiorariand noted that it would only address the
consensus issue, and not some of the broader scientific and
procedural issues that McCarver had sought to argue.82 The issue
became moot, however, and the writ was denied, after the Court
learned that the recent North Carolina law banning the execution of
the mentally retarded would be applied retroactively.83 Less than a
year would pass, however, before Atkins's case was heard in oral
arguments.
C. Atkins v. Virginia: 84 The Analysis
1. The Majority Opinion: Echoes ofthe Penry I Dissent
Writing for a six-to-three majority,85 Justice Stevens held that, as
aper se rule, executing capital offenders deemed mentally retarded
violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments.86 The majority based its holding on two legal findings.
First, the majority held that a national consensus against executing
mentally retarded offenders, manifested by legislative and opinion
change since PenryI, mandated that these offenders be exempt from
capital punishment. Second, they reasoned that executing mentally
retarded capital offenders violated the Eighth Amendment because
79. See Amicus Brief ofAAMR, Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 121 S. Ct.
1910 (2001).
80. 532 U.S. 941, 121 S.Ct. 1401 (2001).
81. McCarver v. Lee, 221 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2000).
82. McCarver v. North Carolina, 532 U.S. at 941, 121 S.Ct. at 1401.
83. Hall, supranote 45, at 366.
84. 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct.2242 (2002).
85. Id. at 305, 122 S. Ct. at 2244. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined in the majority opinion entirely. It may be worthy to
note that Justice Kennedy joined Justice Scalia's part concurrence/part dissent in
PenryL There, he concurred with the judgment that the Eighth Amendment did not
prohibit executing mentally retarded offenders as a "'perse" rule, and dissented
with O'Connor's finding that the jury instructions were inadequate. Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 351, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2964 (1989).
86. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321, 122 S. Ct. at 2252.
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death is a disproportionate sentence to give a mentally retarded
capital offender. Decreased mental functioning, coupled with an
impaired adaptive behavior, Justice Stevens reasoned for the majority,
must result in a less morally culpable offender who does not deserve
to be executed for his crime.
a) ConsensusFound
The Atkins majority never expressly defined what it meant by a
"consensus," but made use of several methods to find one. Initially,
Justice Stevens suggested that the majority's quest to find a consensus
of like-minded states would be the same objective exercise used in
Penry I, and he noted that the best way to make a consensus
determination would be to look at how state legislation addressed the
issue." This would not be the controlling methodology, however, for
instead of counting state legislation for and against the practice of
executing the mentally retarded as was done in PenryI, the majority
chose a different approach. It decided that the best way to show a
consensus of like-minded states on whether to execute a mentally
retarded offender would be to look at legislation since PenryI and
read the legislative trend. 8 Justice Stevens labeled this analysis as
being the "consistency of the direction of change," and asserted that
this exercise should be more significant when making Eighth
Amendment determinations.8 9 Seeking to support its consensus
findings, the majority also undertook a comparative analysis and
contrasted the state of legislative action at the time of Atkins with
others it had faced in past Eighth Amendment cases. For example,
the majority compared the legislative movement with regard to
executing mentally retarded offenders to the movement dealing with
executing youthful capital offenders and found a much stronger trend
against executing mentally retarded offenders. 90
The Atkins majority would not stop its inquiry with objective
evidence, however. Opting to go further to demonstrate what it saw
as an "emerging" national consensus oflike-minded states against the
execution ofmentally retarded capital offenders, they incorporated a
host ofoutside materials and studies from different interested parties.
In particular, the majority referenced official positions on the issue
87. Id. at 312, 122 S. Ct. at 2247 (quoting Penry,492 U.S. at 331, 109 S. Ct.

at 2953).
88. Id.
at 315, 122 S.Ct. at 2249.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 315 n.18, 122 S. Ct. at 2249 n.18. Since Stanfordv. Kentucky, the
Atkins Court discussed in footnote 18, only two state legislatures raised the

threshold age for imposing the death penalty: Montana (Mont. Code Ann. §
45-5-102 (West 1999)) and Indiana (Ind.Code § 35-50-2-3 (West 1998)). Id.
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from such organizations as the AAMR and the Catholic Church
should be seriously weighed to further tip the consensus scales.9' The
majority also stated that international sentiment and pubic opinion
polls should also bear on the question, and cited the amicusbrief filed
by the European Union and several opinion surveys offered by
Atkins's counsel.9 2 From these opinions and data the court concluded
that a direction of change disfavoring the execution of mentally
retarded offenders existed and held that this wave of change
demanded that the practice of executing mentally retarded capital
offenders be stopped because it violates the Eighth Amendment.93
b) PunishmentNot Fittingthe Criminal
Next, the Court addressed whether the death penalty was a
proportionate punishment to give a mentally retarded offender who
commits a capital crime.9 4 Supporting this further inquiry, the
majority asserted that the Court would not be limited to objective
numerical calculations, reasoning that, in the end, "our (the Court's)
own judgment will be brought to bear" on whether this particular
punishment violates the Eighth Amendment.95 Justice Stevens
divided the proportionality argument between the two common
96
justifications for capital punishment: retribution and deterrence.
The majority argued that the theory ofretribution, or "just desserts,"
depended on the moral culpability of the offender. 97 Because
mentally retarded offenders regularly possess, in the majority's
opinion, considerably impaired mental and functional capacities,
they are as a rule not as morally culpable for their criminal
activity.9" Thus, the Atkins majority concluded that society cannot
justly avenge the capital murders of these offenders.
The majority also held that the absence of the deterrent
component warranted the abolition ofthe death penalty for mentally
retarded capital offenders because they often fail to possess the level
of premeditation and deliberation necessary for deterrence to be
effective.9 9 The same cognitive and behavioral impairments that
91. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21,122 S. Ct. at 2249 n.21.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Idat312, 122 S. Ct. at2247.
95. Id. (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 2868
(1977)) (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 319, 122 S. Ct. at2251 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183,
96 S. Ct. 2909, 2929 (1976)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 320, 122 S. Ct. at 2251.
99. Id. at 319, 122 S. Ct. at 2251 (emphasis added).
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make such defendants less morally culpable, they reasoned,
mandated that these offenders will not undertake the mental
processes necessary for deterrence to be effective.100 Because these
individuals, as a rule, possess mental deficiencies that negate the
two justifications for the death penalty, the majority declared that
the ultimate penalty cannot be constitutionally applied to them.
2. The Dissent: Challengingthe Majority's Math and
Methods
In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist challenged the majority's
pronouncement of unconstitutionality by first questioning its
consensus conclusions. Here, overall legislative evidence, which he
claimed the Court had previously held to be the most reliable,
showed that more states which allowed the death penalty at the time
of oral arguments left the individual decision of executing mentally
retarded offenders to properly instructed juries than those that
prohibited the execution ofsuch offenders as a perse rule.10' Citing
previous cases which attempted to find a "consensus" of state
opinion on a subject, the Chief Justice's dissent recalled that the
court had always made such petitioners bear a heavy burden of
successfully demonstrating a changing national consensus.'0 2 If an
overall look at legislative evidence does not clearly manifest a
changing national opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted, then
there has been no objective change in opinion from the states, and
the constitutional inquiry should end.103
The Chief Justice further admonished the majority for using
international notions and opinion polls to find a consensus of likeminded states on the issue of executing the mentally retarded,
declaring that this betrays the concept of federalism. 04 He qualified
100. Id. at 320, 122 S. Ct. at 2251.
101. Id. at 322, 122 S. Ct. at 2252 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 324, 122 S.Ct. at 2254 (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,
373, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2977 (1989)).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 325, 122 S. Ct. at 2254. To support this statement, Justice Rehnquist
cited language from Stanfordv. Kentucky in which the Court stated that "permanent
prohibition upon all units of democratic government must [be apparent] in the
operative (laws and application of laws) that the people have approved. 492 U.S.
361, 377, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2979 (1989). Justice Rehnquist also scolded the
majority for accepting as evidence of some national sentiment opinion polls which
the Court "lack[s] sufficient information to conclude" are conducted according to
"generally acceptable scientific principles or are capable of supporting valid
empirical inferences" about this issue. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322, 122 S. Ct. at 2253.
He also questioned the ability of the questions asked to find an adequate answer.
For example, if one is asked "Do you think that persons convicted ofmurder who
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this assertion by noting that federalism and the idea and promise of
democratic accountability mandated by our system of government
necessitate that only the work product of legislatures or findings of
sentencing juries be used. °5 Elaborating further, he stated that
international data was grossly inappropriate for ascertaining an
American concept of what is right and wrong or cruel and
unusual.'0 6 Regarding jury actions, the Chief Justice failed to see
comprehensive statistics in the briefs that would indicate either way
how most juries had handled the issue of executing the mentally
retarded. 107
In a separate dissent, Justice Scalia suggested that "[s]eldom has
an opinion of this Court rested so obviously upon nothing but the
personal views of its Members."' '
Justice Scalia employed a
mathematical analysis, calculating that, at most, eighteen of the
overall thirty-eight states (forty-seven percent) allowing the death
penalty prohibited executing those deemed mentally retarded.'0 9
Only seven of those thirty-eight states (eighteen percent), he noted,
prohibit the execution ofall offenders deemed mentally retarded.1 0
are mentally retarded should or should not receive the death penalty?", the answer
would say nothing about the interviewee's opinions or knowledge ofthe culpability
or lack thereof by diagnosed individuals with differing degrees of severity. Id. at
327, 122 S. Ct. at 2255. Thus, those who believe that some who are diagnosed with
mental retardation can be held to be morally culpable, would be left to either answer
completely yes or no, thereby skewing the overall result. Id.
105. Id. at 323, 122 S. Ct. at 2253. Regarding sentencing juries however, the
Court held that this evidence, though compelling, is entitled to less weight than
legislative judgments. Id. In referring to sentencing juries, the Court meant criminal
juries which have the option of imposing a death sentence upon a convicted offender
who possesses some of the traits identified here. Justice Rehnquist noted that jury
evidence was considered more helpful in Coker v. Georgiadue to the overwhelming
statistical evidence presented that "at least 9 out of 10 juries" in Georgia did not
impose the death sentence when faced with rape convictions. Id. (quoting Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596-97, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 2867-68 (1977)).
106. Id. at 325, 122 S. Ct. at 2254 (quoting Stanford,492 U.S. at 369 n.1, 109
S. Ct. at 2975 n.1).
107. Id. at 324, 122 S. Ct. at 2254.
108. Id. at 338, 122 S. Ct. at 2259 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also
argued that the Court did not even address the interpretation given much weight by
the Court in previous cases that the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment that
would have been "cruel and unusual" in 1791. Id. He recalled Justice O'Connor's
discussion of the common law "idiot" in Penry I, and saw no evidence of this
conclusion changing for the present case. Id.
109. Id. at 342, 122 S. Ct. at 2261.
110. Id. The others, he wrote, allow for such executions if the offender was
convicted before the effective date, thereby allowing some "mentally retarded"
offenders to be executed. Id., 122 S. Ct. at 2261-62. Therefore, he argued, this
change is not evidence of a "statement of absolute moral repugnance, but one of
current preference between two tolerable approaches." Id.
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Justice Scalia also criticized the majority's newly created
approach of looking to what states had done recently in the context of
executing mentally retarded offenders to find a consensus of likeminded opinion, rather than looking to what all states have done. He
opined that this methodology is illogical, because if a state's law
already leaves such determinations to juries on an individual basis,
there is no way to change this course except to outlaw the practice.I"'
Therefore, he concluded, only the abolition ofthe practice altogether
would constitute real change.1 2 Regarding the majority's use of
extraneous materials such as opinion polls, Justice Scalia elaborated
on Chief Justice Rehnquist's federalism argument by stating that the
Court had in the past, and should in the future, follow the same
methods to interpret the Eighth Amendment which the Constitution
mandated to pass the Eighth Amendment in 1789-a vote of the
American states." 3 In other words, the states had adopted this
Amendment, and therefore their opinions, and not international
opinion, should decide exactly what it means.
While a greater portion of the two dissents focused on the data
they felt came short of providing the necessary consensus, Justice
Scalia addressed the majority's conclusion that mentally retarded
offenders are per se less culpable than the average capital offender.
He disagreed with the majority's findings that mentally retarded
people are, as a rule, more disposed to commit capital crimes than are
other people." 4 He further reasoned that culpability must not be
confined to the mental strength of the criminal, in that sentencing
juries are also always allowed to assess one's culpability relative to
the heinousness or depravity of the criminal act." 5 As to the
majority's stance that this implementation of the death penalty lacks
deterrence, Justice Scalia noted that the supposed fact that some
criminals will not be fully deterred does not lessen the penalty's
impact any more than the fact that some fully cognizant offenders are
unaware that Virginia has a death penalty." 6 The fact that some
mentally retarded offenders will be deterred and some will not, in his
opinion, only buttresses the argument that this is a determination that
111. Id. at 344-45, 122 S. Ct. at 2263.
112. Id. at 345, 122 S. Ct. at 2263. Justice Scalia would rather the Court have
worded its "consistency-in-the-direction-of-change" approach to state "No State has
yet undone its exemption of mentally retarded, one for as long as 14 whole years."

Id.

113. Id. at 346, 122 S. Ct. at 2264.
114. Id. at 350, 122 S. Ct. at 2266. Justice Scalia stated that, in his experience,
the opposite is true: being childlike generally suggests innocence rather than
brutality. Id.
115. Id. at 351, 122 S. Ct. at 2266.
116. Id.
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should be made on an individual basis by a jury with a defendant's
diminished intellectual development acting only as a proper
mitigating factor.' 17
A final point addressed by Justice Scalia's dissent was the
majority's argument that prosecutors should not be able to seek death
when trying such offenders because of their lesser ability to assist
counsel as well as their propensity to offer unsolicited confessions
and contradict themselves in testimony. Justice Scalia's dissent
argued that if such offenders are found competent to stand trial, that
they cannot be treated any different than merely lesser intelligent,
inarticulate, or even ugly individuals, who some believe also face a
special risk of wrongful execution.118 If this argument rests
anywhere, the dissent reasoned, it may rest in a due process claim,
which has nothing to do with whether the death penalty violates the
Eighth Amendment." 9
III. ANALYZING ATKINS V. VIRGINIA: AN EXERCISE IN LOGICAL
VIGILANCE

The Atkins majority erred because its holding relied on two legal
findings which do not pass a thorough test of logical vigilance.
Logical vigilance requires that the Court be held to account for the
serious deficiencies ofits reasoning. The holding failed first because
it relied on a suspect and novel "consensus" analysis, which grouped
states together as a force ofmoral will without acknowledging serious
differences in their opinions on the issue. The majority also refused
to truly address and appreciate the dynamic and uncertain state ofthe
science of mental retardation, particularly the ramifications from
troubled methodology regarding assessment. Diving further into
error, the majority held that mentally retarded offenders are less
culpable as a per se rule, an assertion that finds little true scientific
support beyond advocacy, leaving the overall holding nothing more
than a watered down constitutional postulate.
A. Relying on "Consensus"
1. GeneralShortcomings
Writing for the Atkins majority, Justice Stevens asserted plainly
that he found an adequate nationwide consensus of opinion
suggesting that mentally retarded capital offenders should not be
117. Id. at 35 1-52, 122 S. Ct. at 2266-67.
118. Id. at 352, 122 S. Ct. at 2267.
119. Id.
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executed.' 20 Though sounding powerful, assiduous analysis reveals
that the majority was only able to form a consensus by departing from
the commonly understood meaning ofthe word 2 ' and dismissing the
courts to demonstrate a consensus of
exercise used by previous
122
constitutional thought.
The danger in the novel approach is important to critique because
future courts will be bound by this analysis when interpreting the
Eighth Amendment in the future. When the overall question of
whether the death penalty is unconstitutional is tried again, courts will
have to sort out this new process. By changing the process, the
majority essentially changed what it was counting. Previous cases
took the total amount of states that allowed the death penalty and
asked whether they allowed the execution of a person who met the
particular issue of concern. 23 Atkins has made this objective
consensus process entirely too complicated. Now, one must look to
recent legislation, but the majority failed to state how recent the
legislation must be. It would have courts look to extraneous data
such as opinion polls, but failed to provide standards by which to
judge a poll's scientific adequacy. It would also have courts take into
account the opinions ofthe international community, but failed to say
why this is allowed or which bodies truly represent the opinion of the
international community. Overall, future courts are left with guesses
and uncertainty, all the more reason to keep the test objective and
explicit.
Further illustrating the Court's inadequate analysis in Atkins, the
majority completely refused to acknowledge the reasoning that had
guided the Court in so many previous Eighth Amendment cases. This
form of constitutional interpretation, that of assessing whether the
particular crime would have been considered cruel and unusual at the
time of the adoption of the Eighth Amendment in 1789, was used by
the Court in both Fordv. Wainwright124 and Stanfordv. Kentucky.'
This is not to say that the Atkins majority is wrong because it does not
adhere to the originalist view of constitutional interpretation. It is
only to say that the consistency in direction of change test and its
questionable methodology, although accepted by six of the Justices,
is an exercise never before seen in the Supreme Court's many past
120. Id. at 315, 122 S. Ct. at 2249 (Stevens, J., for the Court).
121. Webster's dictionary defines "consensus" as "general agreement" or
"unanimity." Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (9th ed. 1991).
122. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315-16, 122 S. Ct. at 2249. Previous precedent (e.g.
Stanford)had looked to the state's laws to see if a consensus of opinion existed,
whereas Stevens opted to look for the "consistency of the direction of change." Id.
123. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989);
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct 2934 (1989).
124. 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595 (1986).
125. 492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969 (1989).
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interpretations ofthe Eighth Amendment. This note will concede that
there is a credible argument that what a constitution means should
evolve somewhat with the evolution of its citizenry, but will not
concede that Atkins's make-shift analysis should form the basis of
bedrock constitutional law. 126 The Court's test does not pass the
benchmark of such an important process, and this is even more
apparent when one scrutinizes the statutes ofthe majority's eighteen
''consensus" states.
2. Clear Declaration of Moral Will?: A Closer Look at the
Eighteen Statutes
A close investigation of the eighteen statutes of the states
addressing this issue reveals that they possess such important
differences that they cannot be considered a manifestation ofcollective
moral will. The majority suggested that although there are differences
in specifics, the idea is the same: mentally retarded capital offenders
should not be executed. In the areas that are considered essential to
making accurate assessment of the mentally retarded, however, there
should be adequate consistency. In order to be a collective voice of
moral will for the purposes suggested in Atkins, these statutes must
announce a consistent policy as to both who is exempt from execution
and why that person is exempt. This differentiates moral will from
state experimentation with criminal law. The Constitution is structured
around a notion of federalism that demands that states be allowed to
legislate freely (within constitutional bounds) in order to perform their
role as "laboratories ofexperimentation."' 27 Further, this experimental
legislation is important to properly flesh out what policies work for
particular localities and which do not. 128 To be true to recent precedent
regarding both Eighth Amendment interpretation and notions of how
states should be allowed to experiment with legislation; therefore, the
Court should have been especially hesitant to group together potential
"pilot legislation" as anational voice. This subsection distinguishes the
statutes that the majority saw as its embodiment of collective moral
will by using the AAMR definition of mental retardation, also used by
the majority opinion.'29
Each state attempted to fit their targeted offender somewhat
closely into the intellectual and adaptive framework ofthe AAMR's
definition. 3 ° The AAMR, of course, requires a third "age of onset"
126.
127. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1641 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
128. Id.
129. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308-09, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 2245 (2002).
130. Brief of Amici Curiae for the States of Alabama, Mississippi, Nevada,

492

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 65

finding: that the individual display the intellectual and adaptive
impairments before the age of eighteen. 3 ' Nebraska and New
Mexico, however, two of the purported "consensus" states, do not
include this in their definition.'32 The failure to require manifestation
before a certain age should seriously undercut the majority's assertion
of a voice ofcollective moral will (considering that Atkins's counsel
suggested in briefs that this part ofthe definition was essential to an
accurate assessment) because it is the key element that insures against
an offender malingering his tests to escape execution. Because a
definite age of onset is so important to insuring that a diagnosis is
accurate, states without this requirement should not be considered as
part of a collective voice.
Even states that include language reverent to the AAMR's
developmental period disagree as to when this period should
commence. Maryland and Indiana law set their maximum age of
onset at twenty-two. ' While even the AAMR does not mandate that
eighteen be the age by which these symptoms must be present, only
suggesting this age, these further differences illustrate how dynamic
the study of this field of science really is. Apparently age of onset is
extremely important, as discussed above, but two ofthe "consensus"
states would give an offender four more years to "develop" these
symptoms. Individuals age eighteen to twenty-four are, percentagewise, the largest group of violent criminals.' 34 Considering concerns
of malingering, this difference would dilute the accuracy of
assessment for the greatest percentage of violent offenders. Clearly,
therefore, Maryland and Indiana illustrate the experimentation with
a dynamic field of science, and not collective and considered moral
will on an issue of crime and punishment.
Other members of the supposed "consensus" have set forth
differing definitions of what constitutes sufficient intellectual or
South Carolina, and Utah at 7, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242
(2002).
131. AAMR, supranote 8. Atkins's counsel suggested in briefs that this part of
the definition was a necessary element of an accurate assessment because of the
additional effects of mental retardation during early, developmental years.
Petitioner's Brief at 22-24, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242
(2002).
132. Brief ofAmici Curiae, supranote 130, at 14 n. 19. The Nebraska and New
Mexico statutes missing this key element are Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-105.01(3)
(1998) and N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-2.1(A) (1991). Id.
133. Brief ofAmici Curiae, supra note 130, at 14 n.22; see alsoMd. Code Ann.,
[Crim. Law] § 2-202 (2004); Ind. Code. § 35-36-9-2 (2004).
134. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, at www.ojp.usdoj.gov
(Last visited Nov. 15, 2002) (Department of Justice statistics show that, although
violent crime is at its lowest point ever in the United States, the highest percentage
is committed by offenders in the 18-24 age group.).
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adaptive impairments to deem an offender mentally retarded and
exempt from execution. 135 In fact, some of these states have chosen
not to define these elements at all. 136 These differences are also
crucial, in that the differences can lead to increased dependency on IQ
test data, which suffers from serious limitations.137 Particularly in the
condensed assessment atmosphere of a capital murder proceeding,
Supreme Court review of undefined or non-uniform statutes can lead
to offenders with similar deficiencies receiving different justice. Six
states define "intellectual deficiency" as an intelligent quotient of
seventy or below. 138 Three states do not use such a strict numerical
definition, opting instead to define the element as a performance on an
intelligence quotient test "which is two or more standard deviations
from the mean score on a standardized intelligent test.' ' 139 The differing
IQ standards may appear docile, but often lead to differing
determinations as to the level of mental retardation, an important
determination in assessing impairment. 4 ° Differing levels of
impairment and differing definitions as to who meets the necessary
impairment tests will cause differing diagnoses from state to state, and
do not manifest states speaking with one voice about this complex
issue.
The language of Kansas's statute is another good illustration of
how these states may have been experimenting with policy and not
making a joint declaration of moral will. Kansas law states that a
person is mentally retarded if he has "significantly sub-average general
intellectual functioning, as defined by Kansas Statutes Annotated 7612b01 and amendments thereto, to an extent which substantially
impairs one's capacity to appreciate the criminality ofone's conduct or
to conform one's conduct to the requirements oflaw."'' Nowhere in
the other seventeen states making up this consensus is there any hint of
such language regarding capacity to appreciate criminality or conform
conduct. By being more explicit in its definition, Kansas would
135. Brief of Amici Curiae, supranote 130, at 8.
136. Id.
137. See infra Part III.B.l.a. for a further discussion of the limitation of these
tests.
138. Brief of Amici Curiae, supranote 130, at 8 (citing statutes from Arizona:
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02(J)(4) (2001); Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
532.130(2) (1990); Maryland: Md. Code Ann. Art. 27, § 412 (f)(3) (1989)
(repealed 2002) (current version at Md. Code Ann., [Crim. Law] § 2-202 (2004));
North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2005(a)(1)(c) (2001); Tennessee: Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-13-203(a)(1) (1990); Washington: Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
10.95.030(2)(c) (1993)).
139. Id. (citing statutes from Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1-1g(b)
(2001); Florida: Fla. Stat. Ann. §.921.137(1) (West 2001); and Kansas: Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 76-12b1(i) (1994)).
140. See infra III.B.1.a. for a complete discussion ofthis phenomenon.
141. Kans. Stat. Ann. § 21-4623(e) (1995).
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apparently exclude some offenders who meet the AAMR intellectual,
adaptive, and age ofonset requirements. Kansas's qualifications ofthe
normal definitions alter the process and make it less determinative on
This more probably is Kansas
a clinical definition alone.
experimenting with legislation than it being part of a consensus of
thought on whether to execute a particularly defined group of capital
offenders.
Evidence of this group of states embodying a moral consensus is
even further questionable ifone analyzes New York's comparable law.
Instead of quibbling over a definition ofmental retardation, New York
opts to use the suggested AAMR definition.'42 Interestingly, however,
this exemption does not apply to all mentally retarded individuals
because New York allows the execution of a person who meets the
43
AAMR definition but commits the murder while in state custody.1
Therefore, New York would allow a mentally retarded offender to be
executed. Clearly, this cannot manifest a will of the people of New
York to not execute mentally retarded offenders, for they expressly
allow it. With so many differing views as to who is considered
mentally retarded, one cannot logically group these states together as
a collective voice suggesting that the same group should be spared from
execution. These states differ because each has its own policy and
reasons for acting as it does, and this is not the collective moral will
which should be used to make a sweeping constitutional declaration
like that in Atkins.
A procedural analysis shows more non-consensus thinking within
the purported consensus, with states disagreeing as to the proper burden
of proof allocated,'" whether the trial court or the jury should be
responsible for determining ifan individual is mentally retarded,'45 and
whether these statutes should be applied prospectively or
retroactively." These states obviously cannot agree exactly who they
would like to exempt from capital punishment or how a court should
properly make this determination. Therefore, their statutes should not
be combined to represent a collective force of moral will.
B. Relying on "Science"
The Atkins majority also held that executing mentally retarded
offenders is unconstitutional because death is a disproportionate
penalty to give a mentally retarded individual because these individuals
are not sufficiently morally culpable. While the majority's culpability
142. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 400.27(12) (2003).
143. Id.
144. BriefofAmici Curiae, supranote 130, at 14-15.
145. Id. at 15-16.
146. Id.at 17-18.
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conclusions are not always wrong, the opinion erred by applying its
conclusions across the mentally retarded spectrum. Some in the field
of psychology believe that such conclusions are overly broad because
they lack true scientific backing.'47 Atkins's broad assertion that
mentally retarded offenders are per se less morally culpable is also
logically flawed if one considers that there is a "changing" definition
of mental retardation among the scientific community 4- and that there
are serious limitations on the methodology used to make an accurate
mental retardation diagnosis.
1. Problems with Methods
Well-known publications recognize that there is limitation to the
methodology of accurately assessing potentially mentally retarded
individuals. 49 Johnny L. Matson, Ph.D., a psychologist who has
diagnosed mentally retarded individuals for over thirty years and
received the AAMR Region V Researcher of the Year Award in 1991,
suggests that the most troubling thing about these limitations is that
they occur in the ideal clinical environment. 50 Therefore, Dr. Matson
says, these limitations increase exponentially when a psychologist must
operate in the highly-stressed situation of a capital murder trial, where
a person who has never sought treatment is being diagnosed, and the
outcome will affect his life or death. "' This heightened concern applies
to Atkins's situation, in that he had never before been assessed to
determine whether he was mentally retarded. 52
a) MeasuringIntellectualDeficiencies
Disagreements over assessing a patient's intellectual deficiencies
can range from what is actually measured by intelligence tests to
more sophisticated criticism that there are "potentially serious
implications of arbitrarily classifying individuals as mentally
subnormal based upon theoretical, statistical constructs of
147.

Interviews with Johnny L. Matson, Ph.D., Director of Clinical Training in

Psychology, Louisiana State University, in Baton Rouge, LA (Sept. 2002-Nov. 2002).
148. Although there is agreement that a three-dimensional approach is best, and
most do focus on cognitive, adaptive, and onset issues, there is always change going

on in the community regarding different organizations and their respective
definitions. For example, afterAtkins, the AAMR's website boasted that one should
pick up a copy of the 2002 edition of its journal to see the "new definition for
2002!" AAMR, at http://www.aamr.org (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
149. Steven Beck, Overview of Methods, in Assessing the Mentally Retarded
3-4 (Johnny Matson and Stephen E. Breuning eds., 1983).
150. Matson Interviews, supra note 147.
151. Id.
152. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002).
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intelligence."' 53 There is agreement, however, that two major tests,
the Weschler (WAIS-II)'15 4 and Stanford-Binet tests, 55 are the most
accurate. The singular reliance given to the intelligence quotient
scores often limits these standardized forms oftesting.156 Therefore,
if one bases determinations of mental retardation or the level of
mental retardation primarily on these tests, one will face serious
trouble in making accurate diagnoses, because some consider this
form a rigid determination of cognitive impairment.'57
While other methods of analysis are encouraged and recognized
by the scientific community, such as adaptive and behavioral factors,
the limitations associated with these tests are important, because a
person's mental retardation level is tied only to the statistical score he
achieves on either of the respected standardized tests.5l' In the widely
respected and oft-cited book on mental retardation Assessing the
Mentally Retarded, for example, the classifications of mentally
retarded individuals ranges from mild to profound based entirely on
IQ scores from the Stanford-Binet and Weschler tests. 59 According
to the data provided, a person scoring from fifty-two to sixty-seven
on the Stanford-Binet and fifty-five to sixty-nine on the Weschler is
considered by the scientific community to be mildly mentally
retarded, whereas an individual who scores nineteen or below on the
Stanford-Binet and twenty-four or below on the Weschler is
considered profoundly retarded. 60 No account is given as to how
these individuals perform on the adaptive or behavioral assessments.
The result is a system truly based on a standardized written test. For
example, a person whose adaptive deficiencies barely fit the
requirements to be considered mentally retarded could be a poor
reader or poor test taker and score very low of the IQ portion.
Despite the fact that this person behaves close to normally, he would
153.

Beck, supra note 149, at 4.

154. The WAIS-III, or the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale, Third Edition, is
scored by adding together the number of points earned on different subtests, and
using a mathematical formula to convert this raw score into a sealed score. The test
measures an intelligence range from forty-five to 155, with 100 being the median
score, indicating an average level of cognitive functioning. A. Kaufman & E.
Lichtenberger, Essentials of WAIS-III Assessment 60 (1990).
155. Similar to the Weschler test, the Stanford-Binet test is more popular in its
role of assessing children with mental deficiencies. There are seven broad
categories to the test, covering language, memory, conceptual thinking, reasoning,
numerical reasoning, visual-motor, and social intelligence. See Beck, supra note
149, at 15.
156. Beck, supra note 149, at 16.
157. Id.

158. Id. at 7.
159.

Id.

160. Id.
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be considered moderately or severely retarded. This diagnosis would
therefore be misleading, because the only severe part of the patient
would be his ability to take a test, not his ability to function in the
world, which is where he committed the capital offense. These
limitations further illustrate a dynamic field of science which is not
yet ready for sweeping per se conclusions of culpability and
functioning.
b) Behavioral/AdaptiveAssessment Limitations
In order to make an accurate diagnosis ofmental retardation, it is
also necessary to assess adaptive functioning ofthe patient. Although
other strategies for doing so may exist, it is generally accepted that an
interview is an indispensable part of any type of behavioral
assessment. 6 ' While intelligence tests have been criticized for their
rigidity, interviews are criticized for their over-subjectivity with too
much reliance on self-reported data.'62 Because the psychological
interview process requires the psychologist to formulate a
developmental history of the patient, interviews with parents and
' According to experts, it
family members are very often necessary. 63
is well documented, however, that information obtained from parents
may not be very accurate or valid and that information from each
parent is often contradictory.' 64 Dr. Johnny Matson suggests that
there are serious limitations on behavioral assessment in an ideal
environment and that the even more grave limitations in the criminal
trial setting mandate that there should not be a "knee-jerk
65 reaction"
to what a particular expert finds in this limited context.1
Considering Dr. Matson's suggestions and the literature
presented, Atkins is even more troubling, because the majority saw
the methodology of assessing the mentally retarded (in the criminal
trial context) as leading to a concrete diagnoses of capacity, rather
than the severely limited and ill-suited environment that the Atkins
experts encountered. For example, Dr. Stanton Samenow, the
forensic psychologist who testified for the state in the penalty phase,
interviewed Atkins and deputies at the jail and reviewed Atkins's
school records. 166 Despite his having the IQ score obtained from
defendant's counsel, he concluded that the behaviors disclosed by
those who knew Atkins did not meet the requirements of mental

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
Matson Interviews, supranote 147.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 309 n.6, 122 S. Ct 2242, 2246 n.6.
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retardation. 167 In this case, however, the Supreme Court chose to
second guess the findings of a jury that believed Dr. Samenow's
testimony that Atkins and his family failed to convince him that
Atkins lacked the capacity to be executed. Reasoning from this, it is
entirely possible, considering these limitations, for a jury to listen to
both experts, but make a credibility call for themselves that the
defendant and his parents were not being completely truthful in
describing the defendant's adaptive capabilities.
Some recent studies also find that the methods used in Atkins are
simply inadequate to determine if an individual is indeed mentally
retarded.168 Behavioral aspects of mental retardation can be more
elusive or problematic than these tests allow, some suggest, and more
tests are needed to truly measure the level of functioning. 69 This
research concludes that measures of motivational status, social
competence in a variety of situations, and physical dexterity are not
adequately emphasized in normal assessment practice. 170 Many
modem examinations, they charge, completely ignore socio-cultural
factors, which
they see as key aspects of a true behavioral
171
diagnosis.

The lack of accuracy and limitation of assessment, especially in
the criminal trial context, makes the majority's perse conclusions of
lack of culpability (rather than individual assessments), which are
predicated on diagnoses from the methods, unscientific and logically
unsound.
C.

CulpabilityConclusions

Throughout Atkins, in both the majority and the dissent, the
justices speak of both culpability and moral culpability. There does
not appear to be a definition for the latter phrase, and it is not a legal
term of art. Thus, fleshing out how juries can find moral culpability
or a lack thereof is particularly tricky. The Court here appears to be
confusing the "right and wrong" ofculpability, which has merit in the
present discussion, with the ability to perceive "right and wrong" in
general a discussion better left when assessing whether a particular
defendant is able to stand trial at all, as is the case of the insanity
defense.172 Outside the context of insanity, courts focusing on the
167. Id.
168. J.R. Mercer, The Impact ofChangingParadigmsofDisabilityon Mental
Retardationin the Year 2000 in Mental Retardation in the Year 2000 15, 33-34 (L.
Rowitz ed., 1997).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.

172. Most people associate the term "moral" with its common definition "of or
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degree ofblameworthiness to which a particular defendant should be
attributed usually speak in terms of criminalcupability. With these
limitations in mind, it is probably better to critique Atkins using this
phraseology.'73
Despite its more frequent usage, the concept of criminal
culpability is very elusive. Most courts agree, however, that in order
to receive a death sentence, an offender must possess the highest level
of criminal culpability. 7 4 The Model Code of Criminal Law, for
example, has chosen to take the route suggested by some scholars and
proscribes different divisions of culpability, with the highest being
"purposeful," and the lowest being "faultless" or "absolute
liability." '75 Criminals act purposefully if their conscious objective
is to cause a desired result.'76 Justifying a broad ban on executing
mentally retarded individuals, the majority stated that such offenders
"by definition" have diminished capacities to understand and process
information, abstract and learn from mistakes, reason logically, and
control impulses.'7 7 They fail, however, to allege that these
individuals cannot act purposefully, or consciously desire the final
result. Suppose, for example, that a mildly mentally retarded
individual, who does not read very well, often touches the clothing
iron when hot, and has trouble controlling his need for free money,
sticks up a liquor store and shoots all three attendants. There is
nothing in the majority's definition that suggests that he could not
seek out and want the result of having the free cash. The majority
would have the world believe that a person must understand
something deeper about killing the attendant (apart from the fact that
it is wrong, of course), than "if I kill them, they cannot kill me, and
I get the money."
Countless journal articles attempt to justify a conclusion that
mentally retarded offenders are less culpable by suggesting that these
individuals may commit crimes on impulse and often cannot correct
improper behaviors. 7 ' These considerations may have weight in a
relating to principles of right and wrong in behavior." Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary 742 (9th ed. 1991).
173. The two concepts of culpability, or legal or criminal culpability, and moral
culpability, appear from research to often be intertwined. Because this note focuses
on criminal consequences for criminal conduct, and for the reasons in the paragraph
above, this note will only deal with criminal culpability.
174. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976).
175. Paul H. Robinson, A BrieffHistory ofDistinctionsin CriminalCulpability,
31 Hastings L.J. 815, 818-19 (1980).
176. Id. (citing Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (Proposed Original Draft,
1962)).
177. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 317, 318, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2250.
178. See, e.g., JonathanL. Bing,Protectingthe Mentally RetardedFromCapital
Punishment:State Efforts Since Penry and Recommendationsfor the Future,22

500

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 65

criminal matter, such as in mitigating evidence, but they do not
address the issue of culpability, or the desire of a person to act
purposefully to create a result. It is not logical to conclude that an
impulsive armed robber who killed every gas station attendant
encountered, and continued until properly punished, was not as
culpable (if not much more) than a person who committed an armed
robbery or murder for the first time.
Avoiding concrete analysis, some commentators suggest that the
definition of mental retardation alone demonstrates the lack of
culpability."7 9 This statement is never backed up by anything but the
words of the definition itself. The plain language of the AAMR
definition, however, does not mention culpability or address
consciously seeking an intended result, nor does this suggestion
address the many differing levels of mental retardation. Considering
differing levels of mental retardation is essential to making an
accurate determination of capacity, because research from the
American Medical Association states that mildly mentally retarded
persons differ from non-retarded persons only in their rate and degree
of intellectual development.' ° One can conclude from this that a
mildly retarded offender possesses the same adaptive or behavioral
traits of the average person, which means that they are merely less
intelligent than the normal offender, and certainly not per se less
culpable.
No scientific research concludes that a person with a differing
degree of intellectual development cannot consciously and actively
act to achieve a result. 'l In fact, thorough analysis reveals that some
advocates who make these broad conclusions oflesser culpability cite
sources that do not agree with their assertions."8 2 An excellent
example of these jumps ofreasoning can be seen in the amici curiae
brief filed on behalf of the AAMR and several other health
18 3
in which the amici
organizations in McCarverv. North Carolina,
sought to convince the court that it is widely recognized that the
culpability of defendants with mental retardation is lessened by their
mental impairments. One of the sources that the petitioner cited to
support this conclusion is a well respected handbook on mental
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 59, 80-81 (1996); Jamie Marie Billotte, Is it
Justified?-TheDeath Penaltyand MentalRetardation,8 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics
& Pub. Pol'y 333, 366-67 (1994).
179. See Bing, supra note 178, at 80.
180. AMA Handbook on Mental Retardation 14-15 (Hebert J. Grossman &
George Tarjan eds., 1987).
181. Matson Interviews, supranote 147.
182. Id.
183. Brief ofAmici Curiae for AAMR, et al. at 33, McCarver v. North Carolina,
532 U.S. 941, 122 S. Ct. 22 (2001).
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retardation authored by Johnny Matson, Ph.D."8 4 While Dr. Matson
agrees that mentally retarded individuals do suffer from mental
impairments, thereby making them mentally retarded in the first
place, he suggests that it is "patently false" that either any of his, nor
any of the widely respected scientific research, can lead one to
conclude that a diagnosis of mental retardation necessitates a
conclusion that the offenders is less culpable for his acts.8 5 Certainly
a mentally retarded capital offender can be less culpable, Dr. Matson
recognizes, and such culpability could possibly stem from his
impairment. 8 6 Dr. Matson suggests that the only truly scientific way
to assess whether such an offender possesses the proper mental state
to consciously and actively seek out an intended result is through
individual assessment, because not all of those who suffer from
mental retardation, as defined b 7 the AAMR, will be unable to
undergo these mental processes.
Conclusions should be backed up with science, not advocacy.
The majority's broad culpability conclusions have no scientific
backing on a per se level, and therefore cannot support a per se
holding. Thus, the dynamic field of mental retardation demands
individualized assessment and individual culpability conclusions.
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF ATKINS V. VIRGINIA

While the central holding of Atkins is clear, the opinion
essentially left to the states the task ofdeciding both which offenders
to deem mentally retarded and what procedures to put in place to
make this determination.' 88 The final answer, of course, will come
from state legislatures, but as cases with mentally retarded offenders
pile up, courts have been forced to carve out rules and mandate
definitions. Louisiana, for example, had never considered the issue
ofmental retardation in the criminal context before Atkins. 89 But, in
State v. Williams, the state's supreme court wrestled with which
definition of mental retardation to use for Atkins petitions, pointing
to different legislative language concerning those seeking mental
retardation disability services."' The Court eventually settled on a
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Matson interviews, supranote 147.
Id.
Id.

188. State v. Williams, 2001-1650 (La. 11/1/02), 831 So.2d 835, 853. For
example, Atkins did not mandate substantively any definition ofmental retardation,
nor did the Court procedurally mandate whether the issue ofmental retardation must
be decided by a judge or jury.
189. Id.
190. Id. The Williams court referred by analogy to Louisiana's definition of
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definition that most closely fit within the AAMR three-part
framework that the United States Supreme Court referred to inAtkins,
but noted that apparently any definition would suffice. 9'
Attempting to fashion Atkins procedure, the Williams Court
explained that not every person currently in jail who suggests he is
mentally retarded would be entitled to "post-Atkins" relief.92 A
defendant must present objective evidence, the Court noted, which
shows that his mental state is at issue. 93 These proceedings would
resemble those deciding whether a defendant would be entitled to a
pre-trial competency hearing. 9 4 Once relief was granted, the
Williams Court ordered trial courts to conduct an evidentiary hearing
to decided whether the defendant is mentally retarded.' 95 The Court
ordered that a "sanity commission," comprised of two or three
experts, and appointed by the court itself, be put together and
subjected to questioning from both parties at the hearing. 96 The
Court explicitly noted, however, that the final decision must be made
by the judge and not by the panel of experts.1 97 Louisiana
jurisprudence applying Williams has utilized its procedure without
suggesting any serious changes or announcing any apparent
shortcomings.
The Louisiana Legislature reacted to Atkins with Code of
Criminal Procedure Article 905.5.1 that demands that both the state
and the defendant must agree in order for the issue of mental
retardation to be tried by the court alone in a preliminary proceeding,
to be proven by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.' "
Otherwise, the article mandates that the issue ofmental retardation is
to be tried by the jury during the capital sentencing hearing.2 °° The
prosecution is entitled under the article to independently examine the
defendant, and any pretrial determination by a judge does not
preclude the defendant from re-presenting the issue to the jury at the
capital sentencing phase.20 ' It remains to be seen how this article will
mentally retarded found in Louisiana Revised Statutes title 28, section 381(12).
191. Id. at 854.
192. Id.at 857.
193. ld. at 857.
194. Id.at 858
195. Id.
196. Id. at 859.
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., State v. Dunn, 2001-1635 (La. 11/1/02), 831 So.2d 862; State v.
Tate, 2001-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 921.
199. Cheney C. Joseph& P. Raymond Lamonica, Criminal Jury Instructions and
Procedure § 7.01, in 17 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2d. ed.) 79, 107 (2003).
200. La. Code. Crim. Proc. art. 905.5.1 (C) (1).
201. Id. art. 905.5.1 (F), (C)(2). Further, section G declares that ifthe defendant
fails to comply with an order to fully disclose all relevant information regarding his

2004]

NOTES

503

be interpreted by Louisiana courts.
While some states have followed Louisianajurisprudence on the
issue of whether the judge orjury should decide the issue ofmental
retardation,2 °2 others have demanded it be a question for the jury.2 °3
Some states have also decided to make the determination on
evidence already in the record, instead of a trial court appointing a
commission of experts.2 ° Instead of looking to their own statutes
for definitions ofwhat it means for a person to be mentally retarded,
some states have opted to simply adopt the AAMR definition
mention in Atkins.205 Seemingly confused just how far Atkins
demanded that states go in defining mental retardation, Alabama
opted to apply the broadestdefinition in those states that prohibit
the execution of the mentally retarded.20 6
States have also differed when considering exactly which type
of evidence to consider to accurately assess whether a defendant
possesses the necessary intellectual component of mental
retardation. Oklahoma courts have held that IQ scores are not
needed at all to prove that a defendant is mentally retarded, and
therefore do not include numbers at all in their definition,2 7
whereas Ohio has stuck to a stricter numerical approach, mandating
that a person with an IQ score above seventy is presumptively not
mentally retarded.20 8
Not surprisingly, federal courts have not been exempt from postAtkins experimenting. Recognizing that Atkins's allowed states to
set definitions and procedures, some federal courts have refusing to
extend Atkins relief beyond what states offer. For example, the
United States Fifth Circuit recently held that there is no
constitutional duty to offer the defendant ajury determination of his
mental retarded status when the state's law don't require such a
finding.20 9
mental capacity or to submit to state examination, he will not receive any pretrial
hearing nor be granted the opportunity to convince a jury at capital sentencing that
he is mentally retarded. Id. art. 905.5. 1(G).
202. See, e.g., Lott v. State, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Ohio 2002) (The matter of
whether the defendant is mentally retarded should be decided by the trial judge and
is not a jury question).
203. See, e.g., Murphyv. State, 54 P.3d 556, 568 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (The
jury must determine if a defendant is mentally retarded, and if so, he is no longer
eligible for the death penalty).
204. Id. at 568-69.
205. Lott, 779 N.E.2d at 1014.
206. Yeomans v. State, 2004 WL 362229,21 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Ex
parte Perkins, 851 So.2d 453 (Ala. 2002)).
207. Murphy, 54 P.3d at 568.
208. Lott, 779 N.E.2d at 1014.
209. In re Johnson, 334 F.3d 403, 404-05 (5th Cir. 2003).
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While states wait on their legislatures to act, their courts have
interpreted the opinion to give them great latitude on the specifics of
how to implement the Atkins order ofnot executing mentally retarded
offenders. There are stark differences in procedure and definitions as
seen above, and only time will tell ifthis lack ofuniformity weakens
the mandate of the Supreme Court's broad ruling of
unconstitutionality.
V. CONCLUSION

In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court of the United States
spared all those diagnosed as mentally retarded from capital
punishment.21 But in doing so, the Court announced a new way to
interpret the Eighth Amendment, one that will lead to uncertainty due
to its subjective and irresponsible methodology. The methodology
included labeling eighteen states as a force of collective will without
acknowledging that, in many important aspects, the laws were not
really the same. States now seeking to pass criminal laws in response
to local concern will now have to worry about becoming part of a
national or world-wide voice, which could make local decisions more
permanent than the individual states had intended, and may lead to a
chilling effect on state legislative experimentation in the criminal law
field. This effectively deprives the entire nation of the results of
Justice Brandeis's "state laboratory experiments," and may have
railroaded a more meaningful legislative progression on this topic.
While the majority zealously "discovered" a consensus of state
will, it failed to recognize the true dynamic state of the study of
mental retardation. Limitations on the methodology needed to assess
the necessary intellectual and adaptive traits, especially in the
criminal trial context, as well as changing notions of what the
disorder really is, demand that individual assessments, rather thanper
se judgments, are necessary to make accurate diagnoses. The
majority also made the fatal error of not considering science when
concluding that mentally retarded offenders should not be executed
because they are less culpable. Once more, the state of science in this
field rebukes this broad conclusion, and again demands individual
assessments.
Assessing potentially mentally retarded offenders individually and
making case by case conclusions about their mental states was the
method utilized by capital punishment states before Atkins. Waiting
for legislative action after Atkins, some state courts have fashioned
procedural frameworks to respond to defendants rushing to seek
Atkins relief. Other state legislatures quickly moved into action to
210.

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002).
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implement Atkins demanded change. In both cases, one is forced to
wait to see whether the Supreme Court ofthe United States will agree
that these states have complied with its broad holding and imprecise
directions.
In the end, one could suggest that this note's vigilance is futile
and unnecessary because even if the majority is wrong, no one is hurt
by the result. Those who would suggest such passiveness in the face
ofjudicial overreaching and would be content to continue the onesided advocacy before the ruling must subscribe to Arthur Leffts
notion that "[t]he propositions ...are logically incoherent; they are
not evil.",21' Good and evil is not the inquiry here. Rather, it is our
duty to go further, for, if we do not, it will be our own fault if
Hamilton's promise is not fulfilled.
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